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In Search of Theory: Towards an Integrating Conceptual Framework for Subsidiary
Research

ABSTRACT
Despite the importance of the strategic choices taken by subsidiary managers to the long
terms survival of their unit, little is known about the phenomenon. (Dörrenbächer & Geppert,
2009, Scott, Gibbons, & Coughlan, 2010). This paper analyses and synthesises the research
streams on subsidiary management to date to provide critical conceptual insights and proposes
a new theoretical approach to subsidiary analysis, applied to the critical routine of subsidiary
strategy.
The adoption of more global business structures by MNEs has led to additional strategic
constraints on subsidiary managers (Buckley, 2009, Buckley & Ghauri, 2004, Mudambi,
2008), which we categorise as the dual embeddedness constraint, the domain constraint and
the resource constraint. Paradoxically despite these exacerbating constraints, expectations on
subsidiary managers to create knowledge and innovation and develop their mandate are
escalating, forcing them to evaluate the range of strategic decisions remaining under their
control,
While the literature implicitly assumes that subsidiary managers can respond to MNC
pressures by reconfiguring resources and developing capabilities (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998),
improving performance (Subramaniam & Watson, 2006) and influencing the strategic
direction of the MNE as a whole (Andersson, Bjorkman, & Forsgren, 2005, Williams, 2009),
there is an absence of guidance on how subsidiary managers develop strategies to achieve
these options, and influence strategy from below (Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2007). Our
review of the empirical and theoretical research on subsidiary management identifies how the
tensions between the headquarters perspective and the subsidiary perspective have resulted in
the application of inappropriate conceptual frameworks. Platforming from the four primary
theoretical approaches applied to date, and combining critical tenets of both the resourced
based and transaction cost approaches, we develop a conceptual framework which overcomes
prior theoretical limitations and offers a new perspective of subsidiary to apply to the
subsidiary unit of analysis.
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In Search of Theory: Towards an Integrating Conceptual Framework for Subsidiary
Research

INTRODUCTION
The MNE/subsidiary literature to date has examined the respective roles and relationships
between headquarters and subsidiaries, and determinants of their respective contributions to
organisation. The initial objective of theory was to minimise agency risk through maximising
headquarters control of subsidiary activities (Roth and O’Donnell, Doz and Prahalad), which
evolved to perceiving the MNE as a federative structure, which achieves competitive
advantage through harnessing the knowledge and initiative generation of its dispersed
subsidiaries (Andersson et al, 2007). More recently, the emerging perspective of the MNE as
a ‘global factory’ suggests that strands of separate activities are distributed to subsidiaries by
a remote, controlling headquarters (Buckley, 2009).

The sharp contrast between the federative approach to understanding subsidiary behaviour
and the ‘global factory’ view has critical implications for deriving normative theory and
practitioner guidance from subsidiary research. In response to this theoretical and
management imperative, we examine how critical strategic management perspectives have
been applied to understanding the evolution of subsidiary role. By analysing the theoretical
lens adopted to date in exploring the determinants of subsidiary role and contribution to the
MNE, we identify and build a conceptual framework which overcomes prior theoretical
limitations and offers a new perspective of subsidiary to apply to the subsidiary unit of
analysis.

The primary contribution of this paper is the development of a conceptual framework which
combines the critical tenets of the two dominant theories of the firm to the subsidiary unit of
2

analysis. This framework integrates some critical elements in the subsidiary’s context which
should assist in achieving normative implications from future empirical investigations, and
enhance the relevance and value of future research to management needs in a time of
exacerbating expectations and an increasing competitive environment.

The approach taken by this paper is to first demonstrate how subsidiary research to date has
largely evolved in response to business reality, largely with the absence of supporting
theoretical frameworks. The next section considers the appropriateness of the available
theories and the need to uncover the complexities of subsidiary strategy development to
achieve the critical insights for a conceptual foundation. The final section integrates the
insights from exploring subsidiary strategy development with the key tenets of the RBV to
develop a conceptual framework which overcomes prior theoretical limitations and offers a
new perspective of subsidiary analysis.

Conceptual Background
The evolution of research on subsidiary operations of MNEs mirrors the evolution of strategic
management as a distinct discipline, as a classical Strategy Structure Approach, was initially
adopted. Efforts focused on understanding why certain organisational structures were selected
(Daniels, Pitts, & Tretter, 1984, Egelhoff, 1982, Stopford, 1972) and then on finding more
flexible approaches to the traditional hierarchy. It was assumed that structure adapts to fit
strategy, as captured by Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (1989) “transnational solution” to the design
of MNEs, according scant consideration to the role of the subsidiary.

Agency concerns and the need to balance autonomy (Patterson & Brock, 2002) throughout the
MNE with control (Gates & Egelhoff, 1986, Hedlund, 1981), led to a focus on headquarters-
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subsidiary relationships. Increasing recognition of the need for subsidiary support to
implement headquarters’ programmes introduced the concept of subsidiary level decision
making (Hulbert, Brandt, & Richers, 1980). While some acknowledgement of the need for cooperation across the MNE emerged (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1986, Ghoshal & Nohria, 1989), the
‘United Nations Syndrome’ (Bartlett and Ghoshal, (1986) in which headquarters treated all
subsidiaries alike remained dominant.

Recognition of more complex relationships between headquarters and their subsidiary units
led to the MNE process perspective (Birkinshaw & Pedersen, 2009). Subsidiary autonomy,
access to key MNE resources, and the influence of management systems or culture on
subsidiary behaviour were increasingly recognised (Bartlett, 1979, Doz, 1976, Hedlund, 1986,
Prahalad & Doz, 1981, Prahalad, 1976). Headquarters remained the primary unit of analysis
however, until Ghoshal’s (1986) study of subsidiary innovation processes inspired exploration
of how subsidiary autonomy and access to critical resources led to differentiating subsidiary
roles within the MNE (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1986). Subsidiary roles were then classified by
their integration-responsiveness (IR) within the MNE (Jarillo & Martinez, 1990, Prahalad &
Doz, 1987), their strategic positioning and strategy (Taggart, 1997b, 1998d, 1998a). Adopting
the subsidiary as the unit of analysis and, to some extent, taking the headquarters as an
external factor, allowed for a more detailed examination of subsidiary strategic roles
(Patterson & Brock, 2002). Building on the initial analysis of Birkinshaw and Pedersen
(2009), Figure 1 demonstrates the increasing prominence of the subsidiary in theory
development, and the emergence of literature focusing explicitly on aspects of subsidiary role
within the MNE.
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UNIT OF ANALYSIS HEADQUATERS

SUBSIDIARY MANAGEMENT RESEARCH

Strategy Structure

HQ-Subsidiary

MNE Process

Subsidiary Role

UNIT OF ANALYSIS THE SUBSIDIARY

Adapted from Paterson and Brock (2002) & Birkinshaw and Pedersen (2009)

Resolving the Dual Conflicts
Greater recognition of subsidiary role led to a deeper consideration of the complex reality of
subsidiary context, as units operate within an internal network of headquarters and subsidiary
relationships and in multifaceted external environments. The challenge for both the MNE and
the subsidiary is to exploit these positions for the benefit of the organisation overall, but they
must operate within two sometimes contrasting and competing positions. The objective of the
MNE is to exploit its subsidiary network to achieve sustained competitive advantage. This
may conflict with the often dual objectives of subsidiary management, to contribute to their
parent organisation and to ensure the survival of their unit. These complexities are reflected in
the intertwining nature of the literature exploring the evolution of subsidiary role.

Research moved from exploring subsidiary differentiation based on unit responsibilities,
served markets, network position, competencies and resources, to investigating the roles of
centres of excellence (CoE), or subsidiaries with specialist functional activities (Fratocchi &
Holm, 1998, Frost, Birkinshaw, & Ensign, 2002, Holm & Pedersen, 2000, Surlemont, 1998).
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This provided critical insights into how subsidiaries could protect their position by exploiting
their unique capabilities, resources and/or network integration within their MNE (Anderson &
Forsgren, 2000, Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1986), although there is still uncertainty as to how CoEs
arise (Patterson & Brock, 2002). They are however perceived largely as a headquarters led
strategy, whether formally determined or gradually emergent, as it would be difficult for an
individual subsidiary to build sufficient specialised resources and talent within its unit,
without headquarters support (Birkinshaw & Pedersen, 2009). This recognition of specialised
subsidiary roles also led to exploration of factors leading to the development of regional
(Lehrer & Asakawa, 1999, Schutte, 1998) and divisional headquarters (Forsgren, Holm, &
Johanson, 1995), and of subsidiary R&D (Asakawa, 2001, Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005,
Kummerle, 1997, Noble & Birkinshaw, 1998).

Traditionally headquarters was perceived as the driver of foreign direct investment (Chang,
1996, Chang, 1995, Kogut, 1983), and with few exceptions the subsidiary input to initiating
and contributing to the evolution of subsidiary role was overlooked (Crookell, 1987; Jarillo
and Martinez (1990) and Papanastassiou and Pearce (1994). Studies then explored subsidiary
development as a series of stages towards building integration and importance within the
MNE (Birkinshaw & Fey, 2000, Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998, Chang & Rosenzweig, 1998,
Crookell, 1987, Delany, 1998). A new emphasis emerged focusing on the interaction between
the MNE, the subsidiary unit and the local environment (Birkinshaw and Hood; 1998:
Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005). The importance of generating subsidiary initiatives,
developing competence creating mandates (Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005) and engaging in
micro politics (Dorrenbacher and Gammelgaard (2006) accords an accompanying recognition
of the role of pro-active subsidiary management in determining subsidiary role.

6

The researcher’s perspective plays a crucial role in the selection and emphasis of the
perspective on subsidiary evolution adopted (Patterson & Brock, 2002). Brock (2000)
identifies how researchers from larger countries tend to espouse a corporate point of view,
and assume that parent company managers are the predominant drivers of subsidiary
evolution (Chang, 1995, Malnight, 1996). In contrast, research originating from smaller
countries tends to adopt a subsidiary perspective and emphasise subsidiary initiative
(Birkinshaw, 1997).

Initial consideration of the determinants and impact of patterns of information flow between
subsidiaries and HQ led to recognition of the value of Subsidiary Knowledge Networks.
Firstly it was the internal network that was the focus of attention. Gupta and Govindarajan
(1991, 2000, 1994) set about explaining the patterns of information flow between subsidiaries
and their HQ and Szulanski (1996) has contributed to the transfer of ‘best practices’ between
subsidiaires within the MNE. In terms of the subsidiary’s external network research has
focused on the strength of linkages between the subsidiary and its local environment.

Research to date suggests that a subsidiary’s access to an external network will only enhance
its internal network position if it provides superior knowledge of significant importance to
other MNE units (Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2007). Any shift towards a global factory
style operation would reduce subsidiary potential for external embeddedness (Buckley &
Ghauri, 2004, Mudambi, 2008, Yamin & Forsgren, 2006), emphasising the value of
subsidiary internal ‘embeddedness’ within the MNE network as a strategic option for position
protection (Garcia-Pont, Canales, & Noboa, 2009).
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The complexities of subsidiary position are further reflected in recent approaches to
examining Headquarters Subsidiary Relationships which consider how procedural justice can
apply to the headquarters / subsidiary planning process (Kim, 1993a, 1993b, Kim &
Mauborgne, 1991, Taggart, 1997a), the significance of perception gaps between HQ and
subsidiary managers, and the related consequences. (Birkinshaw, Holm, Thilenius, &
Arvidsson, 2000, Holm, Johanson, & Thilenius, 1995, Luo, 2003). The impact of micro
issues, such as political negotiations between subsidiary managers and their headquarters, in
shaping the internal MNE dynamics is also increasingly acknowledged (Dörrenbächer &
Gammelgaard, 2006, 2009, Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2006). The four approaches, which
illustrated in Figure 2 as mutually exclusive for ease of discussion, are in reality, interlinked.

Subsidiary Role:
Sub Streams

Specialised Roles

HQ Relationship
Subsidiary Evolution

Knowledge
Networks

Adapted from Paterson and Brock (2002) & Birkinshaw and Pedersen (2009)

Lack of an Integrative Framework
The pre-ceding analysis of the subsidiary literature demonstrates that different dimensions of
MNC /subsidiary relationships and characteristics have been studied without the application
of a strong integrative conceptual framework and that the work lacks coherency of a
discipline. The work to date has followed the evolution of the unit of analysis based on
8

observance of practitioner behaviour but has failed to develop a cogent approach. Borrowing
from the firm level theory to the subsidiary unit, simply adds another level of complexity in
addition to, as bemoaned by Birkinshaw and Pedersen (2009), the eclectic and
incommensurable nature of most MNE theories. But before we can build on the approaches
taken to date we must consider their value.

Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) while not specifically developed for the MNE context is
the most broadly used theory in analysing the MNE. It seeks to rationalise MNE existence in
terms of ownership specific advantages against incumbent domestic competitors, location
specific advantages that favour investment in the local economy , and the intermediate market
failure that favours ‘internalisation’ over other forms of contractual arrangements (Buckley &
Casson, 1976, Dunning, 1980, Rugman, 1981). Despite it proliferation in the literature, there
are a number of international management scholars (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989, Birkinshaw,
2000, Doz & Prahalad, 1991, Ghoshal & Moran, 1996, Hedlund, 1994) who criticise its
ability to provide an in depth understanding of the actual functioning of complex
organisations such as MNEs.

Similarly, network theory can be criticised for failing to offer an appropriate theoretical lens.
The MNE is now predominantly conceptualised as a network (Forsgren, 1992, Ghoshal &
Bartlett, 1990), extending the original application of social exchange theory and resource
dependency (Emerson, 1962). This approach perceives the subsidiary, not as a subordinate
entity within the MNE, but as a node in a network, with links to external and internal actors,
enjoying significant degrees of freedom and influence. While an attractive framework for
exploring how subsidiaries evolve and exchange information with other actors, its main
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weakness, is that it is frequently used in a purely descriptive way, which makes it irrefutable,
detracting from its power as a theory (Birkinshaw & Pedersen, 2009).

Similarly the promise of Institutional theory, (Rosenzweig and Singh (1991) and Westney
(1994, 1990), argues that firms will deliberately adopt practices and behaviours similar to
others in their task environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, Meyer & Rowan, 1977).
Westney argues that subsidiary units face competing isomorphic pulls from the host country
and from the rest of the MNE. by comparing the practices of an individual unit to those in the
host country and the MNE, implications could be drawn about the MNE’s strategy. This line
of thinking was applied to a number of empirical studies (Rosenweig & Nohria, 1995,
Westney, 1990), but the interest in institutional theory has dropped of in recent years baring
some exceptions (e.g. Kostova & Roth, 2002).

A number of other theoretical perspectives also occasionally feature in subsidiary
management research. For example, Birkinshaw (1999) portrays the MNE as an internal
network system in which subsidiary units compete with one another for charters, but it is not
yet clear if this approach will yield any valuable insights. In addition, several concepts have
been adapted from the social psychology literature, including procedural justice (Kim &
Mauborgne, 1991) and feedback seeking behaviour (Gupta, Govindarajan, & Malhotra,
1999), to model the HQ subsidiary relationship. Agency theory has also been used in this way
(Chang, 1999, Kim, Prescott, & Kim, 2005) but its usefulness for studying headquarters and
subsidiary relationships has been questioned (Watson O'Donnell, 2000).

Interestingly, the theory which is arguably the dominant conceptual paradigm in strategic
management has received relatively little attention in the MNE literature. The resource based
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view of the firm has the potential to contribute greatly to the study of the MNE, but with few
notable exceptions (e.g. Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998, Rugman & Verbeke, 2001) it has been
largely ignored. The key premise of the Resource Based View is that under certain conditions
a firm’s unique bundle of resources and capabilities can generate competitive advantage
(Barney, 1991) More recent literature also focuses on the development of dynamic
capabilities and knowledge as drivers of competitive advantage (Grant, 1996, Teece, Pisano,
& Shuen, 1997). So why has a theory that offers so much potential been underused in the
study of the MNE? We argue that the level of analysis constitutes the primary concern. The
resource based view implicitly assumes that resources and capabilities are developed in one
large firm, whereas the reality in the MNE is that resources are dispersed around the firm, at
the parent and subsidiary levels.

In our search for a new conceptual framework to address these concerns, we need to more
deeply examine the strategy processes which underlie resource deployment and capability
development at the subsidiary level.

Developing Strategy to Drive Subsidiary Development

Considering the depth of subsidiary management research it is unusual that from a strategy
perspective there are no clear insights to guide both researchers and subsidiary managers
(Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2009, Scott, Gibbons, & Coughlan, 2010). One of the factors
behind this has been the confusion over what constitutes subsidiary strategy and what are its
main components? A distinction is commonly made in the literature between the concepts of
subsidiary strategy and subsidiary role. A subsidiary’s role is assigned to it by the parent
company, whereas subsidiary strategy suggests some level of choice or self determination on
the part of the subsidiary (Birkinshaw & Pedersen, 2009). The underlying premise of
11

subsidiary strategy is that despite the constraints placed on subsidiary management by
headquarters and the marketplace, they still make decisions of their own volition, not simply
on behalf of HQ.

We argue that it is inappropriate to include competitive advantage as the objective of
subsidiary strategy development, as the subsidiary is only one part of the corporation and
competitive advantage is commonly argued to arise as a result of the unique configuration and
coordination of a corporation’s activities (Porter, 1996). The important elements of subsidiary
strategy as identified by Birkinshaw and Pedersen (2009), are the market positioning
component and the resource development component. Strategy is about how these two
components are brought together taking into account that subsidiaries’ customers and
competitors are very often with the MNE network in a model of co-opetition (Luo, 2005). To
study strategy development at the subsidiary level it is important to analyse how well
subsidiary managers identify with the two components of strategy and secondly how many of
the components of subsidiary strategy are actually under the control of the subsidiary
manager?

Subsidiary strategy development must recognise the range of constraints on its behaviour and
in its ability to develop strategy. The dual embeddedness constraint relates to their operation
within two parallel webs of differentiated networks, the internal web that includes all the
other units of their parent MNE, and the sometimes overlapping, but often separate complex
external local network of customers, suppliers and other institutions (Nohria & Ghoshal,
1994). The domain constraint comprises the typically pre set business domain limiting their
market positioning options(Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998). The resource constraint refers to their
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inability to act independently in acquiring or utilising resources, and their need to maintain
lateral relations with other units of the MNE (Birkinshaw & Morrison, 1995).

Market Positioning
There are significant trends underway which look set to further limit the freedom at which
subsidiaries shape their market position. The emergence of global customers for products has
meant that subsidiaries are no longer required to develop products for the specific needs of a
particular market (Mudambi, 2008). Outsourcing and offshoring of activities has also led to
subsidiaries playing smaller roles within global supply chains (Buckley, 2009). Mudambi
(2008) describes how corporate headquarters may decide on the particular location for value
creation within their value chain, consigning the remaining subsidiary units to fulfil their
specific role with little additional input. Increased access to information has also reduced
knowledge deficit in MNEs, giving headquarters unprecedented access to the activities of
their subsidiaries, reducing the potential autonomy of the subsidiary (Yamin & Sinkovics,
2007). In fact most subsidiaries actually have far less control over their market positioning
that the traditional approach would suggest.

Resource Development
Resources are defined as the stock of available factors owned or controlled by the firm, and
capabilities are a firm’s capacity to deploy resources, usually in combination, using
organisational processes to effect desired end (Amit & Shoemaker, 1993). If a subsidiary is to
be taken as a unit of analysis in its own right is it possible to split up resources and
capabilities between the subsidiary and the MNE? Taking resources first, Birkinshaw and
Pedersen (2009) argue that most tangible resources are held at the subsidiary level, while
most intangible resources are held at the firm level. There are obvious exceptions to this
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analysis but the crucial point is that it is possible to identify a difference in resources. To
make such a split with capabilities is a much more difficult task. Some capabilities are
definitely held at the firm level and are distributed across the network of subsidiaries. Others
emerge at the subsidiary level for example and are particular to individual subsidiaries. The
majority, however, are located somewhere between the firm level and the subsidiary level
making them very difficult to separate.

This highlights the difficulties in studying strategy development at the subsidiary
management level and we develop a new approach to address these shortcomings. Rather
than applying a single theory to the study of subsidiary strategy it is proposed in this article
that due to the difficulties associated with taking the subsidiary as the unit of analysis
combining elements of two theoretical approaches could offer the greatest avenue for the field
to develop.

A STRATEGIC THEORY OF THE SUBSIDIARY
The difficulties in applying theory to the study of subsidiaries highlight the need for strategy
researchers to develop a framework. In his review of the strategy field, Foss (1999) contends
that strategy research has been heavily influenced by both economic theories of the firm and
the resource-based view. Rumelt (1984 p.557) proposes that the obvious future for the study
of business strategy is to ‘rest it on the bedrock foundations of the economist’s model of the
firm’.

Foss (1999 p.727) outlines that the ‘strategic theory of the firm’ should be focused on
addressing the following four areas:
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1.

The existence of the firm – namely, why do firms exist as distinct mechanisms for
resource allocation in a market economy?

2. The boundaries of the firm – namely, what explains why certain transactions are
governed in house while others are governed through market relations?
3. Internal organisation – namely, why do we observe different types of (formal and
informal) organisational structure, and accompanying phenomena, such as internal
labour markets, job ladders, profit centres etc?
4. Competitive advantage – namely, which factors amount for superior rent earning
capability? Ultimately, this issue concerns why firms are heterogeneous.

Foss used this comprehensive criterion to evaluate the economics of organisation and the
resource based view. His findings confirmed that the economics of organisation was strong on
issues .1, .2 & .3 and the resource based view was strongest on issue .4. The reason for this is
more than likely based in the historical development of both theories. Whereas the economics
of organisation began with issues .1, .2 and .3 (existence, boundaries and the internal
organisation of the firm) and then moved to being applied to issue .4 (competitive advantage),
the resource based view began with the analysis of issue .4 and has, in more recent times
moved on the addressing the other issues. Is this paragraph necessary?

When studying subsidiary strategy, competitive advantage (issue 4) is not the sole concern as
the subsidiary is only one part of the corporation and competitive advantage is commonly
argued to arise from the entire organisations activities. Issues such as the boundaries of the
firm and the internal governance of the firm however, are crucial as they have a direct impact
on the strategic options available to subsidiary management.
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This highlights the less than straight forward task for subsidiary strategy research. Foss (1999)
proposes two approaches available to researchers, ‘isolationism’ and ‘integrationism’. The
first of these research strategies isolationism, which he argues is incomplete, implies that the
strategic theory of the firm should be founded on either the Resource based view or the
economics of organisation alone. The second research strategy, ‘integrationism’, implies that
research on the strategic theory of the firm should be based on ideas from both the economics
of organisation and the resource based view. Foss defends this approach, by arguing in
particular that when there are interaction effects between governance and knowledge
considerations, there is a strong argument in favour of integrationism, while isolationism is
likely to produce a biased view. It is argued in this paper that the study of subsidiary
management has so far followed an isolationist approach ignoring the constant interaction of
governance and knowledge constraints placed on subsidiary managers, but why has this been
the case?

In response, we analysed the theory of the multinational enterprise (MNE), which has been
predominantly developed in what Foss would describe as the ‘isolationist’ approach (1999).
Mmodern transaction cost theory of the MNE (Buckley and Casson (1976), and Teece (1977),
Rugman (1981), Williamson (1981), Hennart (1982). However, according to a number of
prominent management scholars predominantly associated with a more Resource Based
perspective (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989, Birkinshaw, 2000, Doz & Prahalad, 1991, Ghoshal &
Moran, 1996, Hedlund, 1994), this type of international business literature is often viewed as
largely peripheral to obtaining an in depth understanding of the actual functioning of complex
organisations such as MNEs. For protagonists of a transaction cost perspective it is a baffling
situation, where despite its foundation, the transaction cost approach to the analysis of the
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functioning of the MNE, is regarded by some to have little to contribute to the understanding
of the internal functioning of the MNE (Rugman & Verbeke, 2003).

One of the problems for TCE is that it is always associated with a classic problem of
international business research, the choice of an MNE to enter a market. Largely influenced
by TCE, traditional studies treat particular entry as a “transaction”(Anderson & Gatignon,
1986), and a key concern is whether to rely on external market measures (e.g. exporting) or to
internalise operations (e.g. FDI) (Buckley & Casson, 1976). In contrast, the other
predominant theory aises the level of analysis from the transaction to the firm, suggesting that
a particular entry decision cannot be viewed in isolation, but in relation to the overall strategic
posture of the firm (Hill, Hwang, & Kim, 1990), but has had little application beyone the
management of the MNE and its network of subsidiaries.

The RBV highlights the crucial strategic challenges facing managers within organisations,
understanding the functionality of the resources under their control, and understanding those
resources under the control of other firms. But Perteraf and Bergin (2003) note that managers
may be poor at understanding the range of functions from their resource bases for a number of
reasons, one of which being the problems with bounded rationality as defined by Williamson
(1975). This bounded rationality problem is magnified in a modern Multinational corporation
with a network of subsidiaries in dispersed locations. Corporate headquarters are faced with a
decision of whether to insist on high levels of control over their subsidiaries in order to reduce
risk (Chang, 1999) or to allow greater levels of

subsidiary autonomy as outlined by

Burgleman (1983a) and developed further by Birkinshaw and Morrison (1995). Etemand and
Dulude (1986) contend that it is the subsidiary’s relative autonomy that allows it to determine
strategy and thus ultimately control over local returns and performances. To allow this
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situation to develop there is a transaction cost challenge for top management, which calls for
the introduction of transaction cost economising tools so that bounded rationality problems
can be reduced at the subsidiary level (Rugman & Verbeke, 2003).

However, recent evidence suggest that developments in ICT, and increased off shoring and
outsourcing, are enabling corporate headquarters to reasserted much of their control over,
their network of subsidiaries (Yamin & Sinkovics, 2007). Value is now being created in
smaller pockets of the MNE, and the power of the subsidiary unit seems to be on the wane
(Mudambi, 2008). This raises critical questions about the resource based theories of the role
of the subsidiary and the potential for these units to influence the power structure of the MNE
(Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2007, Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998, Birkinshaw, Hood, &
Jonsson, 1998, Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008b). A change is now underway that suggests that
the most recent developments in the MNE, such as the emergence of the global factory
(Buckley, 2009), are more closely aligned with the transaction cost / internalisation thinking
of Buckley and Casson (1976).

Rugman and Verbeke suggest that perhaps a complementary resource based and transaction
cost perspective, is required to describe the actual processes of resource combinations into
competences and capabilities within the MNE (Rugman & Verbeke, 2001, Rugman &
Verbeke, 2003). Verbeke (2003) proposes that economising on internal transaction costs is the
crucial management task facing management with MNEs. The internal firm specific problems
of governing knowledge generation and exploitation, resulting from imperfect markets which
are highlighted by TCE analysis, remain as valid and important to managers today, as they did
when Buckley and Casson (1976) first highlighted them.
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Towards an Integrating Framework
It is proposed that an isolationist approach (Foss, 1999), applying one stand alone theory to
the study of subsidiary strategy results in an incomplete picture. A complementary analysis
employing both transaction cost and resource based considerations has the potential to greatly
enhance this emerging field of research. This type of analysis has been previously employed
by Rugman and Verbeke (2003, 1992) and has also been utilised by Madhok (2002) in the
study of inter firm collaborations. While the relation between the RBV and TCE is both rival
and complementary, it is really more of the later than the former (Williamson, 1999).

The insights provided by applying this approach to subsidiary strategy development enable us
to propose the following conceptual framework. We believe it represents the first tentative
stepts towards a comprehensive subsidiary theoretical foundations, capturing the nuances of
the complex position of the subsidiary unit of analysis.
Diagram to be included and discussed.

From a resource based perspective subsidiary strategy is based on developing the resources
and capabilities which are under the control of subsidiary management. However, as
Birkinshaw and Pedersen (2009) acknowledge the goal of this strategy is not to achieve a
competitive advantage in the traditional resource based approach. Instead the focus of
subsidiary strategy is to develop resources and capabilities which are highly valued, and as a
result are internalised within the MNE ensuring the subsidiaries survival and future
development. This approach to subsidiary strategy is more in line with the Transaction Cost /
Internalisation thinking of Buckley and Casson (1976) and Rugman and Verbeke (2001, 2003,
1992). To truly unravel all the full picture of subsidiary strategy a theoretical basis combining
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resource based and transaction cost considerations has the potential to increase the relevance
and validity of research to both theory and practice.
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